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Brown: American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953

view Norstad as an American commander
only. The details cannot be developed
within the confines of a review, but in the
end Norstad was forced to walk the
plank—though the final jump was delayed for a period of two months by the
administration’s need for his assistance
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Robert Jordan has produced an important work that is thoroughly researched,
nicely written, and most insightful. No
doubt it will be the definitive biography
of Lauris Norstad—Cold War airman,
strategist, and diplomat. The book will
also be of interest to those involved in the
study of civil-military relations, especially
in these years of increased commitment
of U.S. military forces in multinational or
international interventions.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont

Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in
Korea, 1950–1953. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2000. 252pp. $35

Conrad Crane is a research professor for
military strategy at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, and
formerly a professor of military history at
the U.S. Military Academy. Crane previously wrote Bombs, Cities, and Civilians:
American Airpower Strategy in World War
II (1993), which is widely respected for
its rich and adroit analysis. American
Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 is
a comprehensive, thoroughly researched
treatment of the many issues that the
newly constituted U.S. Air Force faced as
a result of having to fight its first war as
an independent service—a war that it

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001

BOOK REVIEWS

185

was not doctrinally or materially
prepared for, and that the service had
neither anticipated nor especially wanted
to fight. Crane logically takes the reader
through the war from the prehostilities
period, which generally set the stage for
the limited character of the war and specifically established the character of the
Air Force’s contribution; the opening
moves and initial setbacks; the miraculous
end-around at Inchon and subsequent
march to the Yalu; the bitter winter of
1950–51; and finally to the stalemate
along the thirty-eighth parallel.
Crane analyzes the performance of the Air
Force in conducting air warfare in a regional, limited conflict at a time when the
service was focused on strategic nuclear war
and restricted by government policy as to
the resources that could be allocated to Korea. It was a condition that the Air Force
would again confront in Vietnam. The Korean War presented the Air Force with a
myriad of challenges, not the least of which
was the attempt to meet high expectations
for operational effectiveness based on results obtained during World War II.
However, the very nature of the new conflict constrained that effectiveness. A classic example of the limited nature of the
Korean War was the prohibition against
crossing the Yalu River to engage enemy
forces or interdict lines of communication. Crane also takes great pains to highlight how austere were the resources
made available to the Korean area of operations, because the Air Force was required to maintain the bulk of the active
component in a ready status to respond
to other worldwide threats. This requirement was the catalyst for many issues
that arose during the conduct of the war,
among them the decision to recall to active duty large numbers of aircrewmen
who had served in World War II and
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were in many cases not keen to leave
their families and jobs to serve in an undeclared “police action.”
In addition, Crane recognizes, the Air
Force was challenged by interservice rivalry with the Army and the misunderstanding of its role in battlefield air
interdiction, and to a lesser degree by
negative perceptions created by strategic
bombing at the expense of close air support for the Army. He points out that the
frustration felt by Army commanders
was exacerbated by the effective and dedicated close-air support provided to the
Marines by their air component. The
Army continually questioned why the Air
Force could not provide for it the same
level of effective support.
Crane also rightly recognizes the effective
leadership and operational genius of the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) planner, Brigadier General Jacob Smart, who was able
to produce a coherent interdiction strategy which he skillfully “sold” to the
Army. Smart recognized the difficulty of
conducting tactical interdiction operations against an entrenched enemy who
did not require much in the way of supply. He reoriented FEAF’s interdiction efforts away from cutting tactical lines of
communications to striking such operational targets as hydroelectric facilities,
supply distribution centers, and other
“deep” targets, all with some effect.
Crane’s book is a valuable compilation of
the contributions of the Air Force in the
prosecution of the Korean War. Crane
reveals the warts but also gives glowing
credit where it is due. Much more than a
mere chronology, this is an insightful
book that is a must-read for critical students of this conflict.
WILFRED F. BROWN

Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
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Gardner, W. J. R. Decoding History: The Battle of the
Atlantic and Ultra. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1999. 263pp. $34.95

For thirty years after the Second World
War, historians said very little about the
role of signals intelligence in the Battle of
the Atlantic—because either they did not
know about the Allies’ remarkable
code-breaking successes, or they could
not write about what they did know.
That changed in 1974, when revelations
about ULTRA exposed the full extent of
the Allied penetration of Germany’s signals. Unfortunately, in the subsequent
rush to rewrite the history books to include ULTRA, its significance was frequently inflated.
In this study of ULTRA and the Battle of
the Atlantic, Gardner offers the most
fully developed case yet that monocausal
explanations for the Allied victory in this
campaign are inadequate—that ULTRA
was only one critical factor among many.
Gardner provides two case studies to
support his argument. The first demonstrates that Britain’s growing ascendancy
over the U-boat in 1941 had many causes,
most of which were unconnected with
ULTRA. Just as important as code breaking, if not more so, was the tightening up
of the convoy system and the German
decision to shift U-boat operations westward in order to avoid the increasingly
hostile environment around the British
Isles. The greater availability of escort
vessels and growing American assistance
also played an important part in turning
the tide in Britain’s favor in 1941. It is
therefore a mistake to suggest, as some
have done, that ULTRA alone may have
saved as much as two million tons of
shipping during this period.
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